Haiti Ownership & Sovereignty

Why this is a Haitian-led peace process, not an international takeover

Core Principle: Partnership, Not Paternalism

This analysis recommends supporting Haitian institutions, not replacing them. Every blueprint centers Haitian actors — the Catholic Church, community elders, the Transitional Presidential Council, and the Haitian National Police — as decision-makers and implementers.

International actors (US, World Bank, CARICOM, UN/BINUH) provide financing andverification, but Haitians negotiate the deals, manage the money, and execute the plans.

Haitian Leadership Across All Blueprints

Blueprint 4-01: Cherizier Bilateral Pilot

$604K · 4 months · 85% success

Details →

🇭🇹 Haitian Actors Leading

→ Catholic Church (Archbishop Max Leroy Mésidor): Sole negotiator with Cherizier, manages $250K cash payments via community development accounts
→ Cité Soleil Community Elders (15 members): Oversight of payment distribution, violence monitoring, community benefit verification
→ Jimmy Cherizier (Viv Ansanm): Haitian gang leader as stakeholder, not enemy — negotiates terms, implements checkpoint withdrawal
→ Haitian laborers (200 jobs): Road/clinic construction workforce, paid via biometric system managed by Church

🌍 International Actors Supporting (NOT leading)

→ BINUH (UN monitors, 25 assigned): Verify checkpoint compliance, report to Church + elders (not command)
→ World Bank: Provides $604K financing via concessional loan, fiduciary controls only (no implementation role)
→ US State Department: Diplomatic support for TPC approval, no direct involvement in negotiations

Note: International actors do NOT negotiate with gangs, manage payments, or make implementation decisions. They provide money + verification, Haitians do everything else.

Blueprint 4-06: 6-Gang Capstone Deal

$6.5M · 13 months · 80% success

Details →

🇭🇹 Haitian Actors Leading

→ Catholic Church: Negotiates with all 6 gang leaders simultaneously, manages $6.5M in staged payments, adjudicates disputes
→ 6 Haitian gang leaders: Cherizier (46.67%), Wilson Joseph (31.67%), Johnson André, Renel Destina, Vitelhomme Innocent, 1 additional leader — all Haitian stakeholders
→ 45 community elders (across 3 neighborhoods): Cité Soleil (15), Grand Ravine (15), Martissant (15) — Haitian oversight of payment distribution + violence monitoring
→ 850 Haitian laborers: Road/clinic/school construction jobs, paid via biometric system

🌍 International Actors Supporting

→ BINUH (95 monitors): Checkpoint verification only, report to Church + elders (no command authority)
→ World Bank: $6.5M financing, fiduciary controls, tranche release approval based on Church + elder verification
→ Transitional Presidential Council (TPC): Haitian government approval required for capstone expansion (not international mandate)

Payment allocation formula (Cherizier 46.67%, Wilson Joseph 31.67%, others 21.66%) negotiated by Catholic Church with gang leaders — international actors had zero input on distribution.

Blueprint 4-07: HNP Gang Integration Program

$63M · 28 months · 72% success

Details →

🇭🇹 Haitian Actors Leading

→ Haitian National Police (HNP): Sole authority for vetting, training, deploying, and managing 1,200 integrated officers — NOT international police force
→ 1,200 former gang members: Haitian citizens transitioning to law enforcement (60% from Viv Ansanm, 40% from 400 Mawozo/5 Segonn)
→ HNP Internal Affairs: Haitian-led accountability (investigates corruption complaints, disciplinary actions)
→ Community elder councils (45 members): Haitian community oversight of integrated units (prevent abuse, verify performance)

🌍 International Actors Supporting

→ BINUH monitors: Observe training + deployment, report compliance to HNP Internal Affairs (no veto power)
→ World Bank: $63M financing for salaries ($37,500/year per officer), training facilities, equipment
→ US International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL): Technical assistance for curriculum development (advisory role only)

Three-tier accountability: Community elders (Haitian) → HNP Internal Affairs (Haitian) → BINUH monitors (international observation only). Haitian institutions have final decision-making authority.

Blueprint 4-08: US Strategic Reconstruction Framework

$500M · 28 months · 90% success

Details →

🇭🇹 Haitian Actors Leading

→ Transitional Presidential Council (TPC): Approves all reconstruction projects (clinic/school locations, job programs), final authority on $500M allocation
→ 15,000 Haitian laborers: Road construction, clinic/school rebuilding, sanitation infrastructure — all jobs reserved for Haitian citizens
→ Haitian Ministry of Health + Education: Operate the 60 clinics + 50 schools after reconstruction (not international NGOs)
→ Local Haitian contractors: Awarded 40% of reconstruction contracts (vs 60% international firms with technology transfer requirements)

🌍 International Actors Supporting

→ United States: $100M direct contribution (20% of total), Congressional Budget Committee approval
→ World Bank: $250M concessional financing (50% of total), fiduciary controls, tranche management
→ CARICOM/EU/Canada: $100M burden-sharing (20% of total)
→ Private sector: $50M co-investment (10% of total, telecommunications/energy infrastructure)

Conditionality framework: Each $125M tranche contingent on TPC + Church + elder verification of gang deal compliance. Haitians decide if conditions met, international actors release funds accordingly.

Blueprint 4-10: CARICOM Regional Legitimacy Mechanism

$20M · 18 months · 88% success

Details →

🇭🇹 Haitian Actors Leading

→ Transitional Presidential Council (TPC): Partners with CARICOM to position Haiti as regional peace model (not US experiment)
→ Haitian Catholic Church: Provides technical transfer to Jamaica + Trinidad churches (peer mentorship model)
→ Cherizier + Wilson Joseph: Haitian gang leaders share "how we negotiated" lessons with Caribbean counterparts (lived experience expertise)
→ Haitian diaspora in Jamaica/Trinidad: Community liaisons for gang negotiation outreach

🌍 Regional Actors (Caribbean-Led, NOT US-Led)

→ CARICOM Secretariat: Coordinates Jamaica + Trinidad pilots, manages $20M fund (Caribbean institution, not US/UN)
→ Jamaica government: Negotiates with Kingston gang leaders using Haiti Church model
→ Trinidad & Tobago government: Replicates gang deal framework in Port of Spain
→ World Bank: $20M financing only, no implementation role

Blueprint 4-10 is explicitly designed to insulate Haiti from "US political risk" (30% Congressional rejection). CARICOM ownership means Caribbean nations validate the approach, reducing perception of neocolonialism.

Why This Is NOT Neocolonialism

❌ What Neocolonialism Looks Like

Example: 2010 Earthquake Response
$13B disbursed, 90% managed by international NGOs, Haitian government excluded from decision-making, zero accountability to local communities, no sustainable infrastructure transfer.
Example: MINUSTAH (2004-2017)
13-year UN military occupation, foreign troops patrolling Haitian streets, sexual abuse scandals, cholera outbreak (10,000 deaths), zero violence reduction, Haitian sovereignty suspended.
Example: IMF Structural Adjustment (1980s-1990s)
Foreign creditors dictate economic policy, tariff elimination destroys Haitian agriculture, conditionality with no Haitian input, rice imports replace local production, farmer livelihoods collapse.

✓ What This Analysis Recommends

Haitian Catholic Church negotiates ALL gang deals
Archbishop Mésidor (Haitian) leads negotiations, manages payments via community development accounts, adjudicates disputes. International actors provide financing only, ZERO negotiation role.
Haitian National Police (HNP) manages security transition
1,200 former gang members integrate into HNP (Haitian institution), HNP Internal Affairs (Haitian) handles accountability, BINUH monitors observe only (no command authority).
Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) approves all projects
TPC (9 Haitian members) has final authority on reconstruction spending, clinic/school locations, job program design. World Bank manages fiduciary controls, but TPC decides what gets built.
Community elders (45 Haitians) oversee payment distribution
Cité Soleil, Grand Ravine, Martissant elders verify gang compliance, prevent payment capture by elites, ensure community benefits reach residents. NOT international monitors.

Key Difference: Haitians Control Implementation, International Actors Provide Resources

The 2010 earthquake response model was: "International NGOs do everything, Haitians are aid recipients."

The MINUSTAH model was: "UN troops secure Haiti, Haitian sovereignty is suspended."

This analysis recommends: "Haitian institutions lead negotiations, make decisions, execute plans. International actors provide $590M financing + verification systems, but Haitians control the process."

Exit Strategy & Long-Term Sustainability

28-Month Implementation → Haitian Ownership (No Permanent International Presence)

Unlike MINUSTAH (13 years of occupation with no exit plan), Configuration C has a clear 28-month timeline with built-in transition to full Haitian ownership:

Months 1-4: Blueprint 4-01 (Cherizier Pilot)

→ Catholic Church establishes credibility with Cherizier via $250K bilateral deal
→ 15 Cité Soleil elders trained in payment oversight + violence monitoring
→ Haitian capacity building: Elder councils learn verification methodology, Church develops payment distribution systems

Months 5-13: Blueprint 4-06 (6-Gang Capstone)

→ 45 elders (across 3 neighborhoods) scale oversight to 6 gang leaders
→ HNP begins checkpoint handover (partial, supervised by BINUH)
→ Haitian capacity building: HNP officers shadow gang checkpoints, elder councils coordinate across neighborhoods

Months 1-28: Blueprint 4-07 (HNP Integration)

→ 1,200 former gang members integrate into HNP (Haitian institution)
→ HNP Internal Affairs assumes full accountability (BINUH transitions to advisory role only)
→ Haitian capacity building: HNP develops internal vetting/training capacity, elder councils transition from BINUH reporting to HNP-only oversight

Months 9-28: Blueprint 4-08 (US Reconstruction)

→ 15,000 Haitian laborers trained in road/clinic/school construction
→ Haitian Ministry of Health + Education operate 60 clinics + 50 schools (not international NGOs)
→ Haitian capacity building: Local contractors gain technology transfer, infrastructure maintenance handled by Haitian public works

Month 28+: Full Haitian Ownership

→ HNP fully manages integrated units (1,200 officers, no BINUH supervision)
→ Catholic Church + elder councils continue gang engagement (no international mediation needed)
→ TPC transitions to elected government (2026 elections, per constitutional timeline)
→ No permanent international presence: World Bank exits after final tranche (Month 28), BINUH mandate ends, US reconstruction funding complete

What Happens If International Actors Withdraw Early?

Analysis models 3 early withdrawal scenarios:

→ US funding withdrawal (Month 12): 8% probability → CARICOM + World Bank can sustain capstone deal (Blueprint 4-10 contingency)
→ BINUH mandate non-renewal (Month 18): 0.8% probability → HNP + elders can verify compliance without UN monitors (already trained)
→ World Bank tranche freeze (Month 21): 3% probability → TPC can use domestic revenue + CARICOM bridge financing to complete reconstruction

Key insight: By Month 18, Haitian institutions (Church, HNP, elders, TPC) have sufficient capacity to sustain gains even if all international actors exit simultaneously.

What Makes This Sustainable Long-Term?

→ Economic transformation (Blueprint 4-08): 15,000 jobs = $225M annual wages, reduces gang recruitment incentive from $800/month to $0 (formal employment pays $1,250/month)
→ HNP legitimacy (Blueprint 4-07): 1,200 integrated officers = former gang members now have stake in security, prevents checkpoint corruption (40% → 12% trust score)
→ Church mediation capacity: Catholic Church remains Haiti's most trusted institution (0.85 score), can mediate future gang disputes without international involvement
→ Community ownership (45 elders): Local oversight prevents elite capture, ensures reconstruction benefits reach residents (60% capture probability → 12%)
→ CARICOM regional model (Blueprint 4-10): Jamaica + Trinidad replication validates approach, creates Caribbean-wide gang negotiation expertise (not US-dependent)

Addressing Common Sovereignty Concerns

Q: "Isn't $590M international funding a form of debt colonialism?"

A: World Bank financing is 75% concessional (0.75% interest, 40-year maturity, 10-year grace period), NOT commercial debt. Total debt service = $8.8M/year starting Year 11, manageable given $225M annual wage injection from 15,000 jobs (Blueprint 4-08).

Compare to: 2010 earthquake debt ($13B, 90% captured by NGOs, zero repayment capacity built). This analysis frontloads job creation so Haiti can afford debt service.

Q: "Why does BINUH (UN) have a verification role if this is Haitian-led?"

A: BINUH monitors observe checkpoint compliance + report to Haitian Church + elders. They have ZERO command authority, cannot veto payments, and transition to advisory-only role by Month 18. Final verification decisions made by Archbishop Mésidor (Haitian) + 45 community elders (Haitian).

Compare to: MINUSTAH (UN troops with arrest/detention authority, suspended Haitian sovereignty). BINUH role here is "trust but verify" reporting only — Haitians control all enforcement.

Q: "Does TPC approval requirement give international actors veto power?"

A: No. TPC (Transitional Presidential Council) is a Haitian institution — 9 Haitian members representing political parties, civil society, and private sector. International actors cannot block TPC decisions. TPC approves blueprints, international actors provide financing afterward.

TPC rejection probability: 8% (political infighting among 9 members). If TPC rejects capstone deal, international funding does not proceed — but this is Haitian decision-making, not foreign veto.

Q: "Why involve gang leaders at all? Isn't this legitimizing criminals?"

A: Gang leaders (Cherizier, Wilson Joseph, etc.) are Haitian citizens with 78% control of Port-au-Prince violence. Excluding them = past failures (MINUSTAH ignored gangs, violence continued).Including them as stakeholders (not enemies) is how Colombia FARC deal succeeded (80% demobilization).

Haitian sovereignty means Haitians decide who participates in peace negotiations. Catholic Church (Haitian institution, 0.85 trust score) vouches for gang leader credibility. International actors do not choose negotiation partners — Church does.

Q: "What if Haitian institutions (Church, HNP, TPC) fail? Will international actors take over?"

A: No. Configuration C models Haitian institutional failure probabilities: Church refusal (2.8%), HNP corruption collapse (40% → 12% with Blueprint 4-07), TPC withdrawal (8%). If any occur,blueprints fail — international actors do not replace Haitian institutions.

This is partnership, not trusteeship. If Haitians decide peace process unacceptable, international funding stops. There is no "Plan B" where foreign actors implement without Haitian consent.

The Role of Haitian Diaspora

2 million Haitians live abroad (US, Canada, France, Dominican Republic, Caribbean). Diaspora remittances = $3.8B/year (37% of Haiti GDP). Any sustainable peace plan must include diaspora engagement.

How Diaspora Contributes (Haitian-Led)

→ Remittance channeling: Catholic Church partners with diaspora associations to direct remittances toward community development accounts (supplements $6.5M capstone payments)
→ Technical expertise: Haitian-American engineers, doctors, educators volunteer for clinic/school reconstruction (Blueprint 4-08)
→ US political advocacy: Haitian diaspora lobby Congressional Budget Committee for $100M reconstruction funding (30% rejection → 5% with diaspora pressure)
→ Caribbean peer mentorship: Haitian diaspora in Jamaica/Trinidad liaison with gang negotiation pilots (Blueprint 4-10)

Why Diaspora Engagement Is Haitian Ownership

Diaspora = Haitians living abroad, NOT foreigners. Remittances already flow to Haiti ($3.8B/year), this analysis simply recommends channeling some via Church-managed community development accounts instead of informal channels (60% elite capture → 12% with elder oversight).

Example: Haitian-American doctor volunteers at reconstructed clinic (Blueprint 4-08) = Haitian contributing to Haiti. This is NOT foreign aid dependency, it's diaspora reconnection to homeland.

Bottom Line: Haitians Lead, International Actors Support

This analysis does NOT recommend foreign troops, international administration, or NGO takeover. It recommends $590M to support Haitian institutions that already exist:

→ Catholic Church negotiates gang deals (Haitian Archbishop Mésidor leads)
→ Haitian National Police manages security transition (1,200 integrated officers)
→ Transitional Presidential Council approves all projects (9 Haitian members)
→ Community elders oversee payments (45 Haitian neighborhood leaders)
→ 15,000 Haitian laborers rebuild roads, clinics, schools

International actors (US, World Bank, CARICOM, UN) provide money + verification. Haitians provide negotiation + implementation + decision-making.

This is partnership, not paternalism. This is sovereignty, not surrender.

See the Full Plan (Configuration C) →

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