Frequently Asked Questions

Short answer: No. This is Church-mediated economic reconstruction with conditionality.

Longer answer: The payment structure is designed to provide economic alternatives to violence, not reward violence itself:

• • Catholic Church mediation: Payments flow through Archbishop Mésidor (0.85 trust score), not directly to gang leaders. Church verifies compliance before authorizing releases.
• • Conditionality is REAL: Blueprint 4-06 (6-gang capstone) has <35 incidents/month threshold. If gangs violate, payments STOP (staged $125M tranches in Blueprint 4-08 mean $375M withheld if compliance fails).
• • Community development accounts: Blueprint 4-01 Turn 45 establishes elder oversight committees manage funds (NOT gang leader personal accounts). Jobs, clinic reconstruction, school rebuilding benefit COMMUNITIES, not just leaders.
• • International precedent: Colombia FARC demobilization, El Salvador gang truces, Liberia DDR programs ALL used cash payments + jobs. 80%+ success rate when combined with verification.

The alternative is continued violence (90% Port-au-Prince gang control, 5,000+ murders 2021-2024). This approach provides exit ramps from gang economy.

Short answer: Because we're modeling terminal failures PLUS recoverable setbacks, not just "best case scenario."

Longer answer: Pass 6 strategic critique identified 3 probability models:

• • Pessimistic (32-35%): Naïve compound probability — assumes ALL setbacks cascade into total failure. Example: If World Bank Board rejects Blueprint 4-01 escrow (12% probability), entire peace plan collapses.
• • Optimistic (94.68%): Only terminal failures matter — assumes recoverable setbacks ALWAYS get mitigated successfully. Example: If business sector refuses jobs pledge (8% probability), US State Dept ALWAYS successfully pressures them to comply.
• • Realistic (60-70%): Most setbacks recoverable, but not ALL. Accounts for decision tree outcomes where mitigation sometimes fails or is only partial.

We use the realistic model because:

• 1. Honesty matters: Overpromising (95%+ success) damages credibility when inevitable setbacks occur.
• 2. Terminal failures are RARE (5.32%): Catholic Church refusal, World Bank Board collapse, 6-gang simultaneous withdrawal are low-probability events.
• 3. Mitigation is documented: 14 recoverable setback scenarios have specific workarounds (Pass 5C decision branches show HOW to recover).

60-70% is viable (better than 50-50 gamble) while remaining realistic (acknowledges residual risks).

Short answer: Staged payments + BINUH verification prevent this.

Detailed mechanism:

Consequences of violation:

• • If Cherizier violates Week 4 (before $250K payment), he forfeits entire escrow.
• • If 6-gang capstone violates Week 12 (after $3M paid), remaining $2.5M withheld.
• • If capstone collapses Month 8 (before Blueprint 4-08 launches), $500M reconstruction never deployed.

Economic incentive: Gang leaders LOSE more from violation than they gain from continuing violence. $250K + $6.5M + $500M potential = $506.75M total exposure. Continuing violence delivers ~$8,000/year gang income. Rational actors choose compliance.

Short answer: Catholic Church has unique 0.85 trust score with both gangs and state. Refusal probability: 2.8%.

Evidence for Church credibility:

• • Historical mediation: Archbishop Mésidor mediated 2021 kidnapping negotiations (Cherizier acknowledged Church "neutrality").
• • Trust topology: Pass 3 analysis shows Catholic Church is ONLY actor trusted by both gangs (0.65-0.75 trust) AND Haitian state (0.85 trust) AND international community (0.90 trust).
• • Institutional commitment: USCCB (US Catholic bishops) provided public support letter for Blueprint 4-08 Congressional appropriation (Turn 6-8 lobbying).
• • Community legitimacy: 55% of Haitians are Catholic (vs. 30% Protestant, 10% Vodou exclusively). Church has parish network across all Port-au-Prince territories.

Refusal risk mitigation:

• • Pass 6 Part 2 models Church refusal as 2.8% probability (TERMINAL FAILURE scenario).
• • If Church refuses, alternate mediators exist: Protestant church coalition (0.65 trust), community elder councils (0.70 trust), but LOWER credibility (success probability drops 77% → 62% for Blueprint 4-01).
• • Pope Francis public statement supporting Haiti violence reduction (2024) signals Vatican approval likely.

Church refusal is low-probability because institutional incentives align: Violence reduction enhances Church influence in Haiti (parishes can operate safely), international recognition (Vatican foreign policy), community service mission.

Short answer: This plan addresses ROOT CAUSES (economic alternatives) not just symptoms (military suppression).

Comparison to past failures:

What makes this different (7 key innovations):

• 1. Gang leaders as stakeholders: Not excluded/suppressed, but integrated with economic alternatives
• 2. Church mediation: Trusted neutral party (0.85 trust score) vs. foreign militaries (0.30 trust)
• 3. Conditionality framework: Staged payments = self-enforcement (gangs police themselves to preserve future tranches)
• 4. HNP integration (Blueprint 4-07): Former gang members become police officers (addresses checkpoint handover collapse)
• 5. Community benefits visible: 60 clinics + 50 schools rebuilt (not just gang leader payments)
• 6. CARICOM regional model (Blueprint 4-10): Caribbean ownership (not US unilateral imposition)
• 7. Evidence-based design: 287,774 words of analysis, 12 international precedents, 133 policy instruments evaluated

Short answer: Vetting excludes violent criminals. Economic reintegration ≠ impunity for past crimes.

Human rights safeguards:

• • Blueprint 4-07 vetting (Phase 1): BINUH + HNP exclude gang members with violent felonies (murder, rape), human rights abuses, active criminal warrants. 60% acceptance rate (1,200 of 2,000 candidates pass vetting).
• • Elder accountability system: Community elders monitor checkpoint conduct, receive complaints, attest to compliance (Turn 61-66 HNP corruption incident shows disciplinary system WORKS).
• • BINUH monitoring: 95 monitors (Blueprint 4-06) + 25 monitors (Blueprint 4-01) conduct independent verification. Monthly reports published (transparency).
• • Payment to communities, not individuals: Blueprint 4-01 Turn 45 establishes community development accounts (elder oversight), NOT gang leader personal enrichment.

Legitimization concern addressed:

• • This plan provides exit ramps FROM violence, not rewards FOR violence. Gang members who integrate into HNP (Blueprint 4-07) surrender weapons, accept police training, submit to community accountability.
• • Cherizier's role shifts from "gang leader controlling checkpoints" to "liaison officer advising HNP on de-escalation" (Blueprint 4-06 Phase 6 Turn 67 — authority transfers to state, Cherizier retains influence without direct control).
• • International precedent: Colombia FARC demobilization included former guerrilla leaders in transitional justice process. 75% reintegration success rate when combined with economic alternatives + accountability.

UN Security Council abstentions (China, Pakistan, Russia on GSF Resolution 2793) cited human rights concerns. This plan addresses those concerns through vetting, elder oversight, BINUH monitoring, and staged conditionality (payments stop if violence resumes).

Short answer: Because this plan addresses systemic failures of past aid + creates replicable model for global violence reduction.

Return on investment (ROI) case:

• • Migration impact: 2021-2024 Haiti violence displaced 700,000+ Haitians (US border encounters increased 400%). $590M stabilization is CHEAPER than border enforcement + asylum processing costs (~$2B annually).
• • Regional security: Haiti gang collapse threatens Dominican Republic (shared border), Jamaica (gang trafficking routes), Caribbean stability. $590M prevents $5B+ regional security crisis.
• • Global replicability: Blueprint 4-10 (CARICOM model) enables Jamaica, Trinidad, El Salvador, Colombia replication. $590M Haiti investment → $2B+ global violence reduction framework (World Bank "Fragile States" program).
• • Precedent value: If this succeeds, gang deal model becomes TOOL in conflict resolution toolkit (not just Haiti experiment). UN Security Council can reference Haiti success in future fragile state interventions.

Why this won't fail like past aid (fiduciary controls):

• • World Bank manages ALL $590M: No funds flow through Haitian government (avoids 40% corruption rate from 2010 earthquake aid).
• • Biometric payment system: Blueprint 4-01 Turn 17 — fingerprint verification prevents payroll fraud (same system used in Afghanistan, Iraq reconstruction).
• • Community verification: 45 elder councils + 95 BINUH monitors = independent oversight (not self-reported by government).
• • Conditionality enforced: If Blueprint 4-06 fails Month 8, Blueprint 4-08 $500M reconstruction NEVER deployed (only $70M exposed, not full $590M).

Burden-sharing structure: US 20% ($100M), World Bank 50% ($250M), CARICOM/EU/Canada 20% ($100M), private sector 10% ($50M). No single donor "owns" failure risk.