Blueprint 4-01

85%
Success Probability

Cherizier Cité Soleil Corridor Pilot

The Proof of Concept — A $604K bilateral deal with Viv Ansanm leader Cherizier to prove payment credibility and unlock the entire peace plan.

At a Glance

Budget

$604,000

  • • $250K escrow payment to Cherizier
  • • $269K job creation (community projects)
  • • $85K Church coordination costs

Timeline

4 months

52 implementation turns documented

Key Actors

  • • Cherizier (Viv Ansanm leader)
  • • Catholic Church (mediator)
  • • World Bank (escrow manager)
  • • Haitian business sector (jobs)
  • • BINUH (verification)

Coverage

67,800 residents of Cité Soleil
Route 1 humanitarian corridor
Port-au-Prince port access

Problem It Solves

The Credibility Paradox: International community won't commit large-scale resources ($500M reconstruction) to unproven gang deals. But gang leaders won't accept small symbolic payments ($10K) that don't demonstrate real economic alternatives.

Blueprint 4-01 bridges this gap with a $250K payment to Cherizier — large enough to prove "payment credibility is REAL" (not symbolic) but small enough to minimize international risk exposure if the deal fails.

Why Cherizier specifically?

  • • Viv Ansanm coalition coordinator (highest operational control: 80%)
  • • Cité Soleil territory control (67,800 residents, Route 1 corridor)
  • • Public visibility (2024 press conference, known negotiator)
  • • Catholic Church existing relationship (0.65 trust score)

How It Works

7 Implementation Phases (52 Turns)

Phase 1: Church Mediation (Turns 1-7)

Archbishop Mésidor approaches Cherizier with preliminary proposal. Credibility starts at 0.40 (gang skepticism high).

Phase 2: Business Sector Coordination (Turns 8-20)

Haitian business consortium pledges $269K for 400 community jobs. Credibility increases to 0.73 as "economic alternatives are real."

Phase 3: World Bank Escrow Setup (Turns 21-28)

World Bank Board approves $250K escrow (9 of 12 votes). Escrow deposit triggers credibility jump to 0.88 — "payment is REAL, not theoretical."

Phase 4: Corridor Pilot Launch (Turns 29-35)

Cherizier commits to Route 1 humanitarian corridor compliance (<5 incidents per 4-week review). BINUH deploys 25 monitors.

Phase 5: First Payment (Turns 36-45)

Week 8 verification: 3 incidents only. World Bank releases $250K payment. Credibility reaches 1.00 — payment proof established.

Phase 6: Jobs Deployment (Turns 46-50)

400 jobs deployed via World Bank biometric system. Elder committees oversee community development accounts.

Phase 7: Success Declaration (Turns 51-52)

Month 4: Cumulative 12 incidents (70% below <5 threshold). BINUH + Church + World Bank jointly declare "Blueprint 4-01 SUCCESS."

Why It Will Succeed (85% Probability)

Success Factors

  • Proven model: Church-mediated cash + jobs programs have 80%+ success rate across 12 international precedents (Colombia, El Salvador, Liberia)
  • GSF integration: Gang Suppression Force (Sept 2025 - Sept 2026) provides military pressure backdrop, increases negotiation leverage
  • Catholic Church credibility: 0.85 trust score with both gangs and state (unique mediator position)
  • Payment large enough: $250K signals "economic alternatives are real" (not symbolic $10K token)
  • Risk-adjusted sequencing: Q4 2025 launch while GSF momentum high, only $604K exposed if failure occurs

Critical Dependencies

  • • World Bank Board approval (Pass 5C models 12% rejection probability → mitigation: US State Dept escalation)
  • • Haitian business sector jobs pledge (Pass 5C models 8% refusal → mitigation: US reconstruction funding leverage)
  • • GSF sustains operations through Q4 2025 (95% probability based on Kenya commitment)

Key Risks & Mitigation

RISK: Cherizier's fighter compliance only 70% (30% defection risk)

Mitigation: Incident threshold <5 per 4-week allows for 30% defection margin. BINUH monitors distinguish "Cherizier-ordered compliance" vs. "fighter independent action."

Probability: 15% (residual risk after mitigation)

RISK: Rival gang interference (G-Pèp, 400 Mawozo attack corridor to sabotage Cherizier credibility)

Mitigation: Incident attribution protocol (Turn 32 precedent) — defensive actions NOT counted against Cherizier. BINUH increases monitoring to 25 observers.

Probability: 10% (G-Pèp strategic interest in sabotaging Viv Ansanm deals)

RISK: World Bank Board rejects escrow (fiduciary concerns about paying gang leader)

Mitigation: US State Dept escalation (Turn 22-24 decision branch) — "US will increase World Bank capital contribution $500M IF World Bank approves escrow."

Probability: 12% → 3% after US pressure (Pass 5C decision tree analysis)

What Happens If This Succeeds

Immediate Impact: 67,800 Cité Soleil residents gain access to Route 1 humanitarian corridor (medical supplies, food aid, economic traffic). Violence incidents drop 70% below baseline.

Credibility Unlocked: Cherizier's $250K payment proof circulates across gang networks. Other gang leaders perceive "World Bank PAID — this is real, not talk." Blueprint 4-06 (6-gang capstone) credibility baseline increases from 0.55 to 0.70 (+0.15 boost).

Blueprint 4-06 Authorization: World Bank Board approves $6.5M capstone deal for 6-gang citywide coordination (conditional on Blueprint 4-01 success). Timeline: Q2 2026 launch.

International Legitimacy: US Congress references Blueprint 4-01 success in FY2026 appropriations hearings (Blueprint 4-08 Turn 9-15). Congressional Black Caucus cites "$250K payment proof" as evidence gang deal model is viable.

Full Documentation

Total documentation: ~25,000 words across skeleton + elaboration + decision tree analysis